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THE MEANING OF TOTEMISM—AN ESSAY UPON SOCIAL ORIGINS

Since the classic theory which found in the rule of the father the original principle of government, and regarded the State as an outgrowth of the household, broke down under the weight of adverse evidence, there has been a disposition to leave problems of origin to sociology. This is not at all surprising, as laborers in the field of political science naturally desire firm ground upon which to build, and the whole subject of social origins has fallen into such a welter of conjecture that the outlook in that direction is repellant. Hence there is at present a marked tendency towards such definition of the terms of political science as will limit its scope to the particular organization of public authority exhibited by the civilized state. The sociologists are quite ready to accept this apportionment, and, in recent works, society is treated as the genus and the State as a particular species, which alone is the province of political science. According to this classification, political science ceases to be a general science having for its subject the nature and institutions of public authority, but becomes a department of sociology, having for its subject that particular species of public authority embodied in the State formed by the accidents of European development.

Whatever may be the convenience of treatment gained by this apportionment, it will be found upon consideration that it is really destructive to political science. Comprehension of the origin of authority is essential to the position of political science as such. Take, for instance, the doctrine of the original contract: Is it possible to avoid the problems which it raises by saying that they belong to sociology and not to political science? They are of tremendous importance in any system of political science, involving its whole character and teaching. It is impossible to withdraw political science from consideration of the question of origins, nor is it done, but the attitude assumed is simply dictatorial. The doctrine of the original contract is condemned, but the condemnation has come through disastrous experience rather than through scientific appreciation.

On the other hand, the study of primitive institutions has been much the loser by being out of touch with political science. The customs, usages and myths of primitive peoples have been studied too exclusively with regard to their cultural significance, and the relation between the polity of native races and their ideas has not been properly appreciated. Considered as political arrangements incident to the life of the community as a whole, savage customs and ideas might conceivably appear in a light which would render them more intelligible than when regarded as incident to individual activities. Discussing the effect of aggregate life upon individual units, Mivart remarks: "It is obvious that, if we were to take any single ant, we could not comprehend the true nature of the creature itself, however perfectly we might become acquainted with every detail of its anatomy and physiology. In order to comprehend its true nature we should require to know its various complex relations to the other individuals and classes

of individuals of that community of which it was a member."¹ The comparison illustrates the difference between anthropology and political science in the mental states they tend to produce. The anthropologist reaches conclusions from the study of individual activities, while the attitude of mind which looks to the nature and functional activities of the community as a whole for the interpretation of individual characteristics, is that to which students of political science are accustomed.

An enormous mass of data has been accumulated in regard to primitive customs and myths, but, as Agassiz used to say, "facts are stupid things until brought into connection with some general law." I purpose in this article to examine, from the standpoint of political science, some recent discoveries made by anthropological research, to see if the method will let in any light upon the obscure problem of social origins. I shall also endeavor to direct attention to the bearing of such considerations upon political science, particularly the beginnings of authority.

The question of origins is at present the great stumbling-block of sociology. Etymologically, the term "society" suggests a synthesis of individuality, but studies of ancient law and investigation of the structure of savage society have demonstrated that the primitive social unit is the group and not the individual. The probability is that even to-day the idea of group personality, rather than that of individual personality, dominates by far the greater portion of humanity. It is, however, unnecessary to adduce evidence upon this point, as it is conceded in recent treatises on sociology². Stuckenberg remarks that "man was socialized before he was individualized."³ How, then, did society originate? The answer now given is that it was through the influence of consanguinity. Stuckenberg says: "He (man) learns from his consanguine companions, is restrained by them, adapts himself to them, makes signs which become accepted means of communication, develops language, institutes various forms and regulations of social life and lays the basis for the future development of society."⁴

It sounds plausible, but it is not borne out by the facts. Anthropological research has shown that the Totemic organization of society is anterior to organization upon the grounds of consanguinity. Primarily, Totemism is not a scheme of relationship between human beings, but between the group and its environment. A conception of kinship with beasts, plants, wind, water, stocks and stones appears to have preceded any conception of human kinship. There are people still existing—such as some native tribes of Australia—among whom perceptions of consanguinity are still imperfect. They have no words indicating individual kinship, and all their terms of relationship are collective, implying that the fundamental relation of the individual was to the group as a whole and not to the parents of the individual. Stuckenberg tries to save his theory by remarking that "the social life finds its condition, not its cause, in the blood relationship; the cause is found in the notions, the feelings and the volitions

¹"Poverty, A Study of Town Life," by B. Seebohm Rowntree.

²Burdett's "Hospitals and Charities." London, 1903.

³"Americans in Process—A Settlement Study." Boston, 1902.

⁴"The Dispensary Problem in Philadelphia—A Report made to the Hospital Association of Philadelphia, October 28, 1903."

occasioned by the biological consanguinity." But primitive conditions of social life may traverse the biological consanguinity. A feud may array against one another the nearest blood relations, even son against father. Among numerous savage and barbarous peoples the social system makes various requirements of avoidance separating those who, according to the classifications of civilized society, are considered members of the same household.

Upon *a priori* grounds, there is no reason why the proto-human species should have been any more subject to social influence, from the fact of consanguinity, than other animal species. That there are "notions, feelings and volitions occasioned by the biological consanguinity" is an assumption of which there is no proof. Adult animals do not behave differently towards blood kin than towards others of their species, and it would hardly be contended that even in the human species consanguinity exerts a specific influence except as it is recognized. Social groups, however established, would tend to become consanguineous from propinquity, but such consanguinity would be a result of sociality and not the cause. It is obvious that some sort of propinquity must have been antecedent to the formation of society, but habitual propinquity among individuals has been produced by natural selection in numerous animal species. The special problem to be solved as regards the human species is how gregariousness was converted into society—that is to say, how the voluntary association of independent individuals was converted into a permanent relation of mutual dependence and reciprocal service conditioning the lives of the individual members. The assumption that it was due to the influence of consanguinity is as devoid of historical basis as the doctrine of the original contract. The evidence indicates the operation of some principle of union independent of consanguinity, so that organized society existed before there was any conception of degrees of consanguinity or any corresponding definition of the family. The theory that society originated as a synthesis of kindred is as untenable as that it originated as a synthesis of individuality. Sociology is unable to give a satisfactory account of its fundamental concept.

But, while anthropology has traced society to a period anterior to family relations founded upon consanguinity, it has found its own stumbling-block in the origin of Totemism and the nature of the tremendous authority it provides. The regulations of savage society founded upon Totemism has a coercive force far surpassing that of law among civilized peoples. Totem injunctions and prohibitions seem to grasp savage nature by the roots of being, producing anxious and scrupulous observance of customs, many of which, to civilized man, appear to be extremely absurd and irrational. When the Totemic organization of society is found to be an aboriginal characteristic in such widely separated parts of the world as the continents of America and Australia, the inference is unavoidable that it must have arisen from the operation of some general cause founded in the psychical constitution of human nature. Vestiges of Totemism have been descried among peoples in advanced stages of social organization,—Semites, Egyptians, Greeks and Romans. Mr. Lang, in summarizing the evidence, remarks: "On the whole, I regard it as more probable than not, that in the

education of mankind, Totemism has played a part everywhere.”⁵ We are forced to conclude that however mysterious it appears to us, Totemism must have presented itself to the savage mind as a matter of the most simple and obvious suggestion, and yet after many years of study it still remains the desperate puzzle of anthropology. As Mr. Lang states the problem: “How did the early groups come to be named after the plants and animals, the name suggesting the idea of connection, and the idea of connection involving the duties of the Totemist to the Totem, and of the Totem to the Totemist?”⁶

Mr. Lang states various theories which have been advanced in explanation—dreams, metaphor, disease of language, folk etymology, nicknames—all unsatisfactory. Mr. Lang himself inclines to the nickname theory. It is a way people have, to nickname other groups or communities in an opprobrious way. Englishmen call Frenchmen frogs—to use one of Mr. Lang’s instances—and with some effort of the imagination it is conceivable that an unlettered savage tribe called frogs for many generations might accept the title and call themselves frogs, but why should willingness to answer to the name suggest the idea of connection with frogs, involving obligations of comity and relations of mutual service?

It may seem ridiculous to think that there can be any gain to political science in such speculations, and yet the problem is really important to political science, for in Totemism the primary strata in the formation of society appear to have been reached, and in Totemic obligations we are confronted with the beginnings of authority.

Let us now turn aside from the theories of sociologists and the conjectures of anthropologists to examine the problem of social origins in the light of a theory propounded by an historian.⁷ In accounting for the indigenous origin of American language groups and culture stages, Payne advances the theory that a sense of group personality was the primary phase of human consciousness. Payne says: “The fundamental personal conception is an ‘our’ or ‘we’ in which ‘my’ and ‘I’ are involved but not distinguished. It is collective; it regards certain human beings as forming a group, and this group as including the members. . . . Language, we cannot doubt, arose in the group. Its first efforts, then, would probably express the relations of things and thought common to all members of the group at the same time; and these would be conceived by each member as affecting not merely himself, but all his co-members. Differential relations must in time supervene, resulting in the discrimination of personalities; but, in general, the personality of languages may be regarded as originally collective, and its original expression, as a collective ‘we’ or ‘our.’ The social group is obviously divisible not only into individuals, but into small aggregates. The business of life, primarily the quest of food, has a tendency so to divide it in practice; and the ‘we,’ or personality of the group, tends to divide itself accordingly.”⁸

The evidence upon which this theory is based is too voluminous and technical

⁵“Dispensary Law Effective.” Stephen Smith, M. D., *Charities*, August 29, 1903.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁷“History of the New World Called America.” By Edward John Payne. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 201.

to be summarized. The subject occupies 185 pages of the second volume of Payne's work, and he traces the operation of the process in detail, by its means accounting step by step for the development of grammatical structure. The full weight of the argument can hardly be appreciated save by philologists, but anyone can see how the theory elucidates a widely diffused grammatical peculiarity of tribal languages. In the Australian and Melanesian languages, in the Dravidian languages of India, in the Malay group, and in the various languages of Asia classed as Turanian, also in extensive language groups of the Indian tribes of North and South America, the first person plural possesses two distinct forms which are usually denominated by grammarians "Inclusive" and "Exclusive." The idiom requires from missionaries attention to some niceties of expression, for when the formula "we have sinned" occurs in prayer, unless the exclusive form of the plural pronoun be used, the applicant would be including the Almighty among those to whom sin was imputed. On the other hand, the same expression occurring in a sermon should take the inclusive form, or else the audience would be excluded from the category of sinners, and the sense conveyed would be: "We, the clergy, have sinned, but not you, the people." As Payne points out, this idiom becomes at once intelligible when it is perceived that the inclusive form is the collective "we" of group personality, while the exclusive form is selective, referring to an aggregate within the group.

The theory indicates, as the parent of human society, an anthropoid animal pack, constituting an undivided entity in its relations to external things, and developing speech as the organ of this group personality, thus creating a psychical unity differentiating the pack from the gregarious animals and causing the divergence in evolutionary process which resulted in the formation of the human species, as distinguished from other animal species. Upon *a priori* grounds, and apart from direct evidence, it seems to me that the nature of language characterizes it as the organ of group personality. Animals express ideas by sounds, and have at command a great variety of sounds amply sufficient for the expression of all states of individual sensation. The combination of sounds so as to express combinations of ideas, thus adapting vocal communication to the expression of reflection as well as of sensation, is not comprehensible save as a process initiated by the vital necessities of the group as an organic whole.

Payne founds his theory upon linguistic considerations, but what we know of ancient law and archaic society tallies with it. Maine has made familiar the fact that ancient law takes no account of individuals, but deals only with groups. The facts collected by anthropological research in regard to savage customs also harmonize with the theory, as for instance, the existence of group terms for family relationship, as among the aborigines of Australia. This inference is confirmed by the fact that while the individual is now connected with a father group and a mother group, and may belong to a husband or a wife group as sex may determine, there are ceremonial practices indicating that a wider collectivity previously existed. The theory is also consistent with the fact that the discrimination of individual rights and relations is among the latest refinements of speech and is still imperfectly accomplished over the greater area of the world

to-day, even among peoples who have made such great attainments in culture as the Chinese and Japanese. Moreover, support to it is given by the physical characteristics of man as an animal. He has not developed upon lines of individual competency, for he is conspicuously deficient in physical weapons of individual attack or defense. Instead of fangs, he has teeth; instead of claws, a flat nail, and his whole body is weak, soft and sensitive as compared with that of any other mammal. The reasonable explanation is that in his case evolution passed from a physical to a psychical plane, established by the substitution of social conditions of development for individual conditions.⁹

The hypothesis implies that the formation of group personality was anterior to the development of human individuality and that the primary motives and interests of human nature were derived from the collective life of the group and its instincts of self-preservation. It follows that social arrangements were originally devised solely with regard to the welfare of the group: that is to say, they were essentially political arrangements. This fact must be accepted as an invariable principle of interpretation in seeking to account for the primitive structure of society. Let us now apply this principle to the elucidation of the mystery of Totemism. In the first place, it should be noted that the conception of group personality originates, not as a distinction between man and nature, but as a distinction between the group personality and external personality. When reflection begins, man imputes as much intention and purpose to natural phenomena as belong to the acts of his own group. He sees personality and evidence of its volition in all nature. Every language, even the most civilized, bears stamped upon it this imputation of personality to nature. As Payne points out, this conception had a prominent place in the physical science of the middle ages. Even Kepler, who laid the foundation of modern cosmic theory, believed that the lungs and gills through which the earth respired, together with other soft parts of its organism, would some day be discovered at the bottom of the sea.¹⁰ If natural phenomena made such a suggestion to a man of the highest scientific attainments in the seventeenth century, how powerful must have been like suggestions innumerable millenniums ago, when the proto-human species was in as raw contact with natural conditions as any other animal species?

Savege man regards his own tribe as but one among other animal tribes, with whose policy he must reckon. This is a state of mind still surviving among our Indian aborigines. As I am writing this article I find the following in Stewart Edward White's story of travel in Northern Canada, entitled: "The Forest," published as a serial in the *Outlook*

"The Woods Indian never kills wastefully. The mere presence of game does not breed in him a lust to slaughter something. Moderation you learn of him first of all. Later, provided you are with him long enough and your mind is open

⁹ A convenient summary of the characteristics of man, considered simply as an animal, is given by Professor N. S. Shaler in "The Natural History of War." *International Quarterly* for September, 1903. The considerations with which we are dealing indicate that man's physical characteristics as an individual do not afford an adequate basis for the particular conclusions at which Professor Shaler arrives.

¹⁰ Vol. I, p. 526.

to mystic influence, you will feel the strong impress of his idea—that the animals of the forest are not lower than man, but only different. Man is an animal living the life of the forest, the beasts are also a body politic, speaking a different language and with different view-points. Amik, the beaver, has certain ideas as to the conduct of life, certain habits of body, and certain bias of thought. His scheme of things is totally at variance with that held by Me-en-gan, the wolf, but even to us whites the two are on a parity. Man has still another system. One is no better than another. They are merely different. And just as Me-en-gan preys on Amik, so does man kill for his own uses."

"Thence are curious customs. A Rupert River Cree will not kill a bear unless he, the hunter, is in gala attire, and then not until he has made a short speech, in which he assures his victim that the affair is not one of personal enmity, but of expedience, and that, anyway, he, the bear, will be better off in the Here-after. And then the skull is cleaned and set on a pole near running water, there to remain during twelve moons. Also, at the tail-root of a newly deceased beaver is tied a thong braided of red wood and deerskin. And many other curious habitudes which would be of slight interest here."¹¹

Bearing in mind that there must have been a period when the proto-human group had no more appreciation of the physical consequences of the gratification of the sexual instincts than any other animal pack, what explanation of the arrival of children would then appear to be so logical as that, like many other things happening to the group, it was due to the agency of that external personality whose tremendous powers and whose continual transformations were a matter of constant experience? Involved in this external personality were the animals, the plants, the sun, moon, stars, clouds, winds, hills, springs, rivers and all other natural individuality. Thus, children would receive Totem names just as our children receive family names, and by the same process of reasoning, different conclusions being reached only because of different premises. In other words, Totemism is simply a primitive conception of family pedigree. The "close and essential connection" between a man and his Totem, which puzzles anthropologists, is due to the fact that the Totem is regarded as his progenitor, so that the Totem name system is no more mysterious than our own system of giving children the same family name as their parents.

If it be said that the actual facts of human reproduction are too simple and obvious to be misapprehended even by such mental powers as existed in the primordial group, the fact may be adduced that such misapprehension still exists among some peoples who preserve the primitive pattern of social organization. Spencer and Gillen, in their account of the native tribes of Central Australia, state emphatically that they have no notion of the connection between sexual intercourse and the birth of children, and even when the idea is suggested to them they steadfastly reject it as incredible. Pregnancy is accounted for as being the incarnation of the Totem within whose sphere of influence it is experienced. Spencer and Gillen give some curious accounts of the precautions taken

¹¹ The Outlook, July 11, 1903.

by the women to keep the Totem spirit from slipping into them.¹² Here we have Totemism exposed in its actual nature. It is the initial surmise in a course of speculation as to human origins which culminated in Darwinism. It is a far cry from the primordial group to Darwin, but both agree that man is the progeny of nature. Totemism is the theory of primitive philosophy; evolution is the theory of the modern philosopher, and the last word has not been spoken.¹³

While Totemism originates as the primitive theory of the Descent of Man, usages based upon that theory are shaped by considerations of public welfare, and hence admit of variation in accordance with public policy. The relation of Totemism to primitive law is, therefore, incidental, and the direct cause of any particular obligation is to be sought for in political intention. For lack of this rule of interpretation, anthropological research has missed the significance of the native ideas about childbirth which have been cited. Anthropologists are pretty well agreed that exogamy—the obligation to marry out of one's own group—is connected with Totemism. It may have originated as a law inspired by dread of the horrible risk incurred by making too free with one's Totem, whose goodwill is regarded as being of such vital importance to the welfare of the community that the only safe thing to do is to go outside of one's own Totem group in mating. But it does not follow that circumstances might not arise under which connubium within the Totem group might be considered allowable or even desirable by virtue of special arrangements for direct propitiation of the Totem. Thus, varieties of usage would occur in accordance with different conceptions of public policy. Such variation is, in fact, found among contiguous tribes in Central Australia.

The native tribes of Australia have strict divisions, maintaining connubium between themselves, but prohibiting connubium within their own membership. Anthropologists incline to the belief that these exogamic divisions were originally Totem groups, although the Totemic significance of the names now borne by the divisions has been lost in the lapse of ages. Among most tribes, each division now includes known Totem groups which are not found in any other division; so that the law of exogamy operates to prevent one from having marital relations with one's own Totem. The tribes whose ideas about childbirth have been cited are peculiar in that Totem groups are now distributed indifferently among the exogamic divisions; so that one may mate in one's own Totem group provided one goes outside of one's own division in doing so. For this reason, Mr. Lang concludes that the usages of these tribes represent "a local variation from the central stream of Totemism, and not Totemism in its earliest known form."¹⁴ But, when the rule of political interpretation is applied, the mystery is cleared up, and the conclusion is suggested that we have in this group a reversion to type, and that, in fact, we are confronted with Totemism in its original form—a scheme of relationship with external personality.

¹² "The Native Tribes of Central Australia." By Spencer and Gillen. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1899. Pp. 202, 228, 265.

¹³ This explanation of the origin of Totemism was suggested to me by facts given in Spencer and Gillen's work, and was set forth in a communication published in *THE ANNALS* for March, 1901, p. 179.

¹⁴ "Social Origins," p. 72.

In the tribes in which exogamy precludes marital relations with one's own Totem, descent is reckoned in the female line, and the children are assigned to the mother's tribal division and particular Totem group. Assuming that the exogamic division of the tribe was originally Totemic, it is obvious that, as new Totems arose, the rule of reckoning children's status by mother's status would fix Totemic exogamy in the structure of tribal organization. If an Emu man marries a Pelican woman the children belong to the Pelican Totem of the division of the tribe to which the mother belongs, and so with the children of her daughters and granddaughters. But when the boys grow up and marry, they mate with the Emu girls, and their children are Emus; so that the Totem groups are permanently identified with the exogamic division in which they originate, and Totemic exogamy is perpetuated as part of the social system, underlying the whole economy of tribal organization, and fortified by the mass of established interests. But among the tribes in which Totemic exogamy has disappeared, although the exogamous tribal division remains, descent is reckoned in the male line, and children are assigned to the father's group. In this case it is plain that maternal ideas of Totem progenitorship are now outside of the structure of tribal organization, and maternal imagination may have free course without social disturbance. If a woman of a tribe in which descent is reckoned in the female line should have a notion that one of her children was not really a Pelican, but was a Wild Duck, a Totem not belonging to her tribal division, membership in which by a child of hers would transgress immemorial law, the elders of the tribe would let her know that she was sadly mistaken, and if she made any fuss about the matter, her husband would be apt to purify her imagination with a club. In tribes reckoning descent in the male line, it would make no difference whatever as regards the tribal organization. Thus, the Totem would tend to become an individual affair, like the personal Manitou among the aborigines of our own country, and the relations with external personality thus created would open new political resources. Thus, it is found that in these tribes, the Totem groups are organized as magic-working societies, who periodically go through an elaborate dramatic ritual to propitiate their respective Totems for the general welfare of the tribe. The variation has arisen, not in the nature of Totemism, but in the application made of Totem ideas, as a result of a change in tribal polity. This change, although immensely important in its consequences, could have been easily accomplished, since among the Australian aborigines there are no property interests to complicate the problem, and the family relations are not yet individualized; so that it makes little or no immediate difference whether descent is reckoned in the male or female line. Natives sometimes pass from one system to the other in ming adopted into a tribe. The savage tendency to adhere to established forms with unreasoning acquiescence is, however, so persistent that any variation must have been initiated by some accidental displacement of routine, but this might readily occur through the vicissitudes of savage life. A tribe wasted by some calamity might have its organization shattered so that the remnant might have difficulty in reconstituting itself by the rule of maternal status, and might adopt the rule of father status under compulsion of circumstances. It would

then be perpetuated by the social inertia which is the leading characteristic of all primitive races. This view of the case is corroborated by the fact that the evidence in regard to the tribes reckoning descent in the male line indicates that they have a common ancestry.

If the anthropologists are correct in holding that Totemism constituted the primeval pattern of social structure, introducing classifications from which systems of consanguinity arose and the various types of the family were developed, then the interpretation of Totemism affords insight into the nature of authority. It is generally admitted that physical force serves but does not create authority, which cannot exist apart from social sanctions. The explanation of the origin of Totemism leads straight to the conclusion that authority is an outgrowth of religion; that is to say, consciousness of external personality and conception of obligation to it. Man is born a religious being just as truly as that he is born a political being, and the one involves the other.

The theory of group personality which has been applied to the elucidation of the problem of Totemism has profound implications affecting the character of political science. It extricates the Aristotelian theory of the State from the paradox in which that theory was left, from which political science has suffered ever since. Aristotle held that, in its logical order, the State is anterior to society. "It is clearly evident that the State is a creation of nature and that man is by nature a political animal. The State is by nature clearly prior to the family and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part."¹⁵ At the same time he argued that, in its historical order, the State is an outgrowth of the household; but, if that be true, then society is really anterior to the State. If, however, the theory of group personality be accepted, and the primitive group be regarded as the primordial form of the State, then the historical order exactly corresponds with the logical order, and we have, as the fundamental proposition of political science: Man did not create the State; the State created man.

The hypothesis to which political science now shows a marked inclination to submit, is that society is a relation which grew out of brute gregariousness, and that modifications of this relation through physical, cultural, economic, ethical and political influences have produced the various forms of social organization, one of which is the State. Hence, society is the generic term, and sociology claims rank as the general science of society, comprehending history, politics, economics, and ethics as sub-sciences. In opposition to this view, the theory of group personality suggests the hypothesis that, in the line of animal development ancestral to humanity, individual activities became subordinate to the life of the group, thus forming the State, whose life activities developed individual human beings and conditioned their nature. The State is, therefore, the permanent, universal and absolute condition of human existence, anterior not only to society and government, but to humanity itself.

The unscientific character of attempts to arrange different peoples in a serial order of advancement, according to a classification of culture stages, has long been recognized, but the method has maintained itself for lack of a better.

¹⁵ "Politics," Book I, Chap. 2, Jowett's translation.

Acceptance of the hypothesis under consideration would introduce other principles of classification, tending to connect political science with the natural sciences, for the hypothesis implies that all institutions are attributes of the State, their development being the result of the continual effort which every living thing makes to adapt itself to its environment, different institutional types being the effect of the variation of State species. It is a familiar principle of development that variations, unimportant in their beginnings, under changed conditions may lead to the formation of new species, different orders of species being the result of radical divergence in lines of development. The divergence in Totemic usage among the native tribes of Australia, to which attention has been called, is from this point of view the initial stage of a process of variation whose expansion under changing conditions would produce massive growths of myths, ritual, ideas, and beliefs, with co-ordinate social organization, such as are exhibited historically by races which have undergone great changes of environment. Such considerations, however, lie beyond the purpose of this essay, which is to call attention to the bearing of anthropological research upon political theory, and to suggest the possibility that anthropological data may eventually furnish the basis of an inductive system of political science.

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